Abstract
The emergence of HPAI had a profound effect on the commercial poultry industry as well as on the rural and backyard poultry.
Much of the spread of the disease occurred due to lack or insufficient Biosecurity measures taken by poultry keepers .
While stamping out or vaccination measures have reduced the spread of the disease so far, it seems that insufficient Biosecurity measures in many countries is keeping the virus circulating and the disease threatening especially rural poultry keepers .
Thus scientists and government officials are still concerned about the possible mutation of the HPAI virus to a state where it causes a pandemic.
This concern is instigating governments , especially in the developing word , to take abrupt and drastic measures towards poultry producers, especially in the commercial sector, which are interrupting production without actually solving the spread of the disease problem .
We have not witnessed so far decisive measures by any government around the globe to enforce vaccination where it is necessary or Biosecurity measures in order to reduce the possibilities of the further spread and hence further mutation of the virus.
This paper will deal with the detailed Biosecurity measures that need to be enforced by legislation and implementation by governments, especially in the developing countries where fair compensation is difficult to adopt and hence stamping out policies do not work.
The paper will list the roles of FAO and OIE in this endeavor and will highlight the need to arrive at policies that can be adopted by governments.
Definition of Biosecurity
In reviewing literature on Biosecurity one finds definitions encompassing biosafety of food products, bioterrorism, risk management of plant pests and animal diseases. FAO went as far as including the introducing and release of GMO under Biosecurity measures.
For FAO , Biosecurity broadly describes the process and objective of managing biological risks associated with food and agriculture in a holistic manner .
'Bio " means life and "security" implies protection. Thus Biosecurity refers to programs designed to protect human, animal or even plant life. Biosecurity is a relatively modern concept and term that is evolving.
As far as poultry is concerned, Biosecurity can be defined as a practice or set of programs that will limit or prevent the introduction and spread of diseases and pests to the poultry farms or flocks and prevent the contamination of production facilities by harmful organisms .
Essential Biosecurity Measures
Many programs have been develop over the years to reduce infection of poultry flocks or to reduce contamination of poultry meat , eggs and processed poultry products.Several government agencies such as extension services or relevant international bodies and industry associations have developed Biosecurity programs for sectorial facilities of the poultry industry all of which aimed at reducing infection of live poultry or contamination of its edible products.
Most of those programs were based on risk assessments of each sector or situation , and were updated as the risk changes. However very common stable risks include:
1-Poultry farms
2- Hatcheries
3- Slaughter houses , meat processing facilities and egg grading or processing facilities.
Biosecurity and Avian Influenza (AI)
We can safely say that the poultry industry has been under the lime light since the emergence of Avian Influenza whether the low or high pathogenic forms. The fast spread of these viruses, their modification as well as mutation has led to human infection and over 200 human fatalities in many parts of the world. This factor has alerted scientists to fear possible mutation of AI to a level where human to human infection becomes possible leading to a pandemic.
Most governments in the world concentrated their efforts on the human factors in this episode more than the poultry health factor inspite of the fact that AI has killed so far over 200 millions birds especially in the industrial sector.
Measures enforced in case of an outbreak have been advised by FAO and OIE and widely adopted by governments. These were limited to eradication (stamping out) of all poultry within a one to up to ten kilometer radius zone area from the infection point. The purpose of this measure is to control the spread of the virus beyond the point of infection by such a distance that ensures its total eradication.
This procedure proved effective if coupled with strict Biosecurity measures that ensured no poultry or poultry products movement outside the zoned area and a fair compensation to all farmers whose flocks were infected or condemned. The success of this procedure has so far been limited to industrial countries such as USA and certain European countries where such action was strictly implemented, and where rural or backyard poultry is rare. Almost all other countries in the world resorted to vaccination against the prevalent virus with varying degrees of zoning / condemnation / compensation/ Biosecurity measures.
Unfortunately only the commercial sector , in an effort to limit their losses in the developing and poor countries, have extensively used vaccination. However the rural sector and back yard poultry were left , in most of these countries , unvaccinated and hence subject to infection and death. Not only such poultry died but infection of certain owners kept on appearing and some of them died too.
These facts led FAO and OIE to recognize vaccination as an essential tool to limit the spread of AI especially in countries where strict and secure Biosecurity measures and fair compensation is not possible and where poultry keepers depend partly or wholly on them for their livelyhood.
Vaccination, although has saved millions of poultry in all countries where AI disease spread, it appears that the degree of success varies from country to country. Factors such as potency of vaccines used, methods and frequency of vaccination , degree of exposure to live virus, and degree of Biosecurity play major roles. Furthermore, modification of the live virus and its sequencing is another new factor in the equation which is requiring to equally modify the vaccines used. Monitoring the titre levels and revaccination, in order to keep these titres high, is becoming a necessity to avoid exposure to the disease.
Nonetheless, appropriate Biosecurity measures are proving to be the most important factors in checking AI and its spread and hence in limiting the possibilities of its mutation and disastrous consequences.
FAO and OIE initiatives
FAO'S seventeenth session of the committee on Agriculture held in Rome 31 Mar.- 4 April 2003 on Biosecurity in Food and Agriculture sets up FAO'S understanding of Biosecurity and describes the initiatives undertaken. This session recognised Biosecurity as never recognised by FAO before.
For FOA, " Biosecurity broadly describes the process and objective of managing biological risks associated with food and agriculture in a holistic manner"
" Biosecurity measures in agriculture are needed to i) protect agriculture production systems , and those dependent on these systems ; ii) protect human health and consumers confidence in agricultural products ; iii) protect the environment and promote sustainable production”
"The issues encompassed in Biosecurity have traditionally been dealt with and implemented in a sectorial manner by means of food safety laws, and animal and plant quarantine and pesticide regulations. There is a growing recognition that Biosecurity will profit from a more integral approach.”
“ FAO has recognized the growing importance of Biosecurity and therefore made it one of the Organization’s sixteen Priority Areas for Inter-disciplinary Action (PAIA). With aid of external assistance , FAO, through the Biosecurity PAIA, undertook to examine and advance Biosecurity in food and agriculture in order to explore possible synergies in relation to standard setting , information exchange and capacity building.”
“ In order to broaden awareness of Biosecurity and to debate its relevance and practicality more widely , particularly in relation to the needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition , FAO convened an international Technical Consultation in Bankok, 13-17 Jan, 2003, with the participation of 38 countries and eight international organizations, including Codex Alimentarius , the International Plants Protection Convention ( IPPC) , OIE , and the Convention on Biological Diversity ( CBD ).
“ Inter-governmental Technical Consultation was the culmination of an FAO process on Biosecurity which included the Inter-agency Meeting , the Expert Consultation, specialized studies and bilateral interaction with interested bodies . Conclusions and recommendations of the Consultation are:
OIE and WHO seem to have left Biosecurity issues to FAO since all three organizations have collaborated in their efforts to combat AI and other poultry and animal diseases.
While WHO concentrated on the human element vis a vis AI or other contagious animal or plant diseases affecting humans , OIE concentrated its efforts on six main missions:
“
The OIE has also developed general principles relating to risk analysis methodology , which is comprised of four components, namely import risk assessment, assessment of veterinary services zoning / regionalization and surveillance and monitoring.”
Perhaps the only area on Biosecurity that OIE has touched was under prevention and control of AI , where significant effort is focused on developing appropriate recommendations for Biosecurity in the context of backyard flocks via: “ Biosafety, Biosecurity and Prevention of Diseases “ and “ Hygiene and Disease Security Procedure in poultry Breeding Flocks and Hatcheries : Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2007.”
Other initiatives on Biosecurity
“ EEC commission decision ( 2005/734/EC) of Oct. 19 , 2005 was adopted laying down Biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early detection system in areas at particular risk.
This decision was amended on 21 October 2005 by adding article 2a re additional risk mitigating measures as follows:
(a)- the keeping of poultry in the open air is prohibited without undue delay ; however , the compentent authority may authorise the keeping of poultry in open air provided the poultry are provided with food and water indoors or under a shelter which sufficiently discourages the landing of wild birds and prevents contact by wild birds with the feed or water intended for poultry ; (b)- outdoor water reservoirs required for animal welfare reasons for certain poultry are sufficiently screened against wild waterfowl; (c)- the poultry is not provided with water from surface water reservoirs accessed by wild birds, unless such water was treated to ensure inactivation of possible virus; (d)- the use of birds of the orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes as decoy during bird-hunting is prohibited ;
2- Members States shall ensure that the collection of poultry and other birds on markets , shows , exhibitions and cultural events is prohibited.”
“Models to rationalize regulatory functions among secretors in the quest for improved effectiveness and efficiency have appeared in a number of countries. For example, new Zealand has had a Biosecurity Act since 1993 a Biosecurity Minister and Council since 1999. In Belize , food safety, and animal and quarantine and environmental issues, are dealt with by a single authority , the Belize Agricultural and Health Authority. “
“The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), disciplines SPS measures in relation to international trade. The Codex Alimentarius Commission ( Codex) , the International Plant Protection Convention ( IPPC) and OIE provide international standards for food safety , plant health , and animal health respectively. “
“The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN) held a meeting represented by their Agricultural and Health Ministers on Jan. 28, 2004 in Bangkok . Recognizing the potential serious impact of AI on global public health , livestock production, trade and economic development, decided to :
“ASEAN secretariat participated in the International Meeting of Ministers of Health on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in Ottawa 24-25 Oct. 2005 and have prioritized five key actions to respond the challenge of AI:
Expert leadership and be on top of the situation.” “U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) produced a regulation on prevention of salmonella enteritidis (SE) in shell eggs in 2004 which included measures like: procurement of chicks and pullets, a Biosecurity program, pest and rodent control program, cleaning and disinfection of poultry houses, refrigerated storage of eggs, producer testing for SE, identification of a person responsible for SE prevention, record keeping requirements. “
“The U.S. Department of Justice called on April 24, 2006 for developing a regional perspective to Biosecurity and pointed out the need for a new paradigm on Biosecurity thus recognizing it as a reality rather than a perception.”
“In the United kingdom, poultry and poultry products movement restrictions were put in place . Identified zones were: Protection Zone(PZ), Surveillance Zone ( SZ), Restricted Zone ( RZ) where movements can or cannot take place without a license are listed for each zone.”
Biosecurity Protocols
Several protocols have been established in various parts of world particularly in most U.S. States, the U.K., New Zealand and Australia , all addressing the Biosecurity issues for poultry production , poultry and egg processing and safety of consumable poultry products. Most of these protocols were prepared by poultry industry associations in collaboration with local authorities.
I will site two schemes to illustrate the degree of realization of the importance of Biosecurity by stakeholders and their willingness to abide freely and cooperatively by the scheme.
The manual covers all the elements of on-farm Biosecurity as it impacts on food safety and animal health, including areas of responsibility of the growers, the processors, the catchers, the cleaners, and other associated personnel. The manual is to be used as a guide to the recommended minimum standards that company Biosecurity manuals and standard operating procedures must contain.
The Code calls for compiling a Biosecurity manual which contains details of the HACCP team, product description process flow charts, a hazard analysis chart, a Biosecurity HACCP plan audit table, CCP monitoring forms, CCP work instructions, supporting programs, HACCP plan verification activities, staff training programs and good management practices. Third party auditors, whose main role is to examine the HACCP plan that has been developed, are to check that it is being implemented correctly.
The critical monitoring points identified in this Code are:
Having reviewed most literature on the subject of Biosecurity, one can conclude the following :
Eventhough the level of Biosecurity on any farm needs to be continuously upgraded and improved, certainBiosecurity measures cannot be imposed by individual farmers or poultry companies. Such issues need to be handled by authorities or governments.
It seems that governments, due to the complexities of issuing laws and acts, have so far not adopted certain Biosecurity measures that could certainly reduce disease transmission from one farm to another or from ranging birds to other ranging birds or commercial farms.
Therefore, in order to really reduce the risks of poultry disease transmission, particularly Avian Influenza, governments have to interfere by issuing acts and directives in the form of laws and enforce their implementation. The most important mandatory measures that require enforcement by law are:
Minimum distance between farms.
FAO and OIE advise minimum radial distances to form specific zones when implementing stamping-out of all poultry, even if uninfected, from the diseased central AI infected farm or poultry. This measure is but an admittance that a certain minimum distance is required , even though coupled with strict quarantining to prevent movement of poultry outside the zoned area, in order to minimize or stop the transmission of the virus and eventually control the disease.
This prompts the call for specific minimum distances between farms and farm types. For example, grandparent farms need to be more isolated than parent farms, and parent farms more than layer farms, and the latter more than broiler farms. Once established as a law, licenses for new farms have to be issued with these minimum distances in mind.
Existing farms not conforming to the new directive need to be given a reasonable time to either sell to or buy from neighboring farms so that management, poultry type and age groups can be unified.
Farm construction
Relevant authorities issuing licenses for building new farms or hatcheries or slaughter houses should modify their specifications and include all Biosecurity related standards such as:
Dogs, cats and farm animals
Directives need to prohibit keeping dogs and cats on the farm premises as well as raising farm animals such as lambs, cattle, horses and particularly pigs.
In the case of dogs and cats, their continuous mobility in the farm premises is a source of contamination between and to the poultry houses and hence to the poultry itself. They may become carriers of certain bacteria or viruses that may infect poultry.
As far as pigs are concerned, there is a real and established fear that AI virus that infects pigs may mutate to a stage where it becomes infective from human to human.
Vaccination
Veterinary authorities should determine the diseases , especially viral, that spread and endanger poultry flocks in specific areas or nationwide . Where and whenever necessary , these authorities must request farmers to vaccinate against such diseases and should have the powers to take the necessary sera samples or swabs to check the immunity levels of such flocks. Same authorities should take care of vaccinating rural and backyard poultry at their own expense and via their staff.
Monitoring and surveillance
Veterinary authorities should impose regular surveillance of farm flocks and rural or backyard poultry to make sure that they do not harbour live viruses that may endanger other flocks. They need to have authority to condemn and stamp out such flocks.
Monitoring should also be imposed on flocks that need to be moved either from one farm to another, such as from pullet rearing to laying, or from farm to slaughterhouses. This procedure is needed to ensure freedom of such flocks from AI or other highly contagious diseases that might infect other poultry on their journey from the farm to their next destination. Permission to moving flocks is subject to their negative status, otherwise such flocks should be condemned/stamp-out and composted on the farm and the compost buried deep on the premises in an appropriate manner.
Handling of manure
Manure may harbour bacteria and viruses that can infect other flocks if moved in open trailers or vehicles.
If the depopulated flocks were healthy, their manure may be moved in closed trucks to other destinations. If the depopulated flocks were condemned/stamped out , their manure needs to be composted with the flocks and deeply buried on the site.
Slaughter houses
New slaughter houses should only be permitted in far away locations from towns or villages or industrial zones, i.e. away from concentration of people. This is to avoid exposure of people to the live poultry that is being received at such slaughter houses. Already existing slaughter houses close to concentration of people, should be given a reasonable time to relocate.
Live markets
Live markets/ wet markets should eventually be prohibited , thus reducing the risk of exposing people to viruses especially AI.
Live/wet markets not only receive birds from commercial farms, which may be monitored, but they receive all types of poultry from rural and backyard poultry keepers, who are difficult to control or monitor and in most cases are unprotected by vaccination.
Live bird movement
All vehicles carrying live birds should be road checked for a special license to move such birds issued by the veterinary authorities confirming freedom of such birds from contagious diseases especially AI.
Housing of rural and backyard poultry and domesticated pigeons. Rural and backyard poultry is exposed to wild and migrating birds which may be carrying diseases especially AI. Once infected , they show sickness, and in most cases their keepers ruch to kill them, defeather and eviscerate them. All human fatalities in Egypt happened to be woman who did just that. I believe that the majority of human infections or fatalities in Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Turkey and other underdeveloped countries have occurred in a similar manner.
Therefore, it is becoming imperative that governments should impose housing of such poultry to avoid their exposure to wild and migrating birds. Such houses may be simple and inexpensive.
Free range poultry
For exactly the same reason that prompted the call for housing rural and backyard poultry, free range poultry should similarly be housed. The range needs to be covered and securely netted from all sides preventing wild and migrating birds from mixing with range birds.
Wild bird hunting
Ideally, hunting should be prohibited by law. However, hunting has become an industry in its own right.
In order to reduce the harm that wild birds may inflict on hunters or processors of the hunted birds, well thought of regulations should be put in place to restrict hunting to reserves or identified remote areas from poultry complexes and concentrations of people. Hunted birds may not leave the designated areas unless properly dressed and cleaned.
Constructing special ponds and use of decoy should also be prohibited outside the designated hunting areas.
Compensation
Cooperation of stakeholders, in the effort to combat contagious disease especially AI, is an absolute must, whether they are commercial poultry farmers or peasants.
No condemnation / stamping out policy has worked in the world in the absence of fair and prompt compensation to farmers.
Developed and industrialized countries have practiced compensation very successfully and have been successful in containing AI without having to resort to vaccination. Besides being cooperative and understanding, farmers in such countries responded because they were fairly and promptly compensated for their condemned flocks, especially the healthy ones that happen to be situated in the zoned areas.
Governments in the developing or undeveloped countries do not have the financial means to compensate . Therefore, they resorted to practicing vaccination of flocks. However, inspite of the use of vaccines, certain failures may appear requiring stamping out. In such cases compensation becomes necessary.
I believe, such countries may seek the help of the World Bank to obtain the necessary funds for compensating farmers, especially those farmers who are abiding by the Biosecurity regulations advised.
Conclusion
Avian Influenza ( AI ) is continuing to spread in the world , eventhough at a slower rate since the use of effective vaccines, especially in the countries where compensation is not possible and hence stamping-out fails, and where rural and backyard, non-vaccinated, poultry exists on a large scale.
Biosecurity is a well provenmeans of checking the spread of this as well as other contagious poultry diseases. However, Biosecurity measures have sofar, been implemented by farmers at their own consent and will. Mandatory Biosecurity measures may have been imposed in the context of biosafety and food security.
Since AI is a threat to humans , and since the benefits of Biosecurity exceed avoidance of exposure toAI to improve poultry performance, enforcing Biosecurity measures on poultry farms and related facilities, such as hatcheries and slaughter houses, should be seriously considered and adopted by FAO and OIE.
In turn, FAO and OIE should persuade all governments of the world to adopt the same Biosecurity measures and enforce them by appropriate legislations and laws.
REFERENCES
FAO- Committee on Agriculture-Seventh Session, 31/3-4/4,2003 Biosecurity in Food and Agriculture. EU Commission Decision 2005/745/EC of 21/10/2005 Biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of HPAI. Poultry Industry of NewZealand- Broiler Growing Biosecurity Manual Info@pianz.org.nz Code of Practice for Biosecurity in the Egg Industry- RIRDC publication No. 01/102, project No. MS001-02.http://www.rirdc.gov.au