Enforcement of Biosecurity Measures in Poultry Farms and Related Facilities

Abstract

The emergence of HPAI had a profound effect on the commercial poultry industry as well as on the rural and backyard poultry. Much of the spread of the disease occurred due to lack or insufficient Biosecurity measures taken by poultry keepers. While stamping out or vaccination measures have reduced the spread of the disease so far, it seems that insufficient Biosecurity measures in many countries is keeping the virus circulating and the disease threatening especially rural poultry keepers. Thus scientists and government officials are still concerned about the possible mutation of the HPAI virus to a state where it causes a pandemic. This concern is instigating governments, especially in the developing world, to take abrupt and drastic measures towards poultry producers, especially in the commercial sector, which are interrupting production without actually solving the spread of the disease problem. So far no decisive measures by any government around the globe have been implemented to enforce vaccination where it is necessary or Biosecurity measures in order to reduce the possibilities of the further spread and hence further mutation of the virus. This paper will deal with the detailed Biosecurity measures that need to be enforced by legislation and implementation by governments, especially in the developing countries where fair compensation is difficult to adopt and hence stamping out policies do not work. The paper will list the roles of FAO and OIE in this endeavor and will highlight the need to arrive at policies that can be adopted by governments.

1.Definition of Biosecurity

In reviewing literature on Biosecurity one finds definitions encompassing biosafety of food products, bioterrorism, risk management of plant pests and animal diseases. FAO went as far as including the introducing and release of GMO under Biosecurity measures. For FAO, Biosecurity broadly describes the process and objective of managing biological risks associated with food and agriculture in a holistic manner. Bio means life and security implies protection. Thus Biosecurity refers to programs designed to protect human, animal or even plant life. Biosecurity is a relatively modern concept and term that is evolving. As far as poultry is concerned, Biosecurity can be defined as a practice or set of programs that will limit or prevent the introduction and spread of diseases and pests to the poultry farms or flocks and prevent the contamination of production facilities by harmful organisms.

2.Essential Biosecurity Measures

Many programs have been developed over the years to reduce infection of poultry flocks or to reduce contamination of poultry meat, eggs and processed poultry products. Several government agencies such as extension services or relevant international bodies and industry associations have developed Biosecurity programs for sectorial facilities of the poultry industry all of which aimed at reducing infection of live poultry or contamination of its edible products.

Most of those programs were based on risk assessments of each sector or situation, and were updated as the risk changes. However very common stable risks include:

2.1.Poultry farms

2.1.1. Location of farm: its proximity from neighboring farms and from traffic or waterways. The further the better.

2.1.2. Construction: good quality poultry houses insulated, elevated from dampness, tight for rodent or wild bird entry, properly ventilated, heated and or cooled.

2.1.3. Fencing: very secure to prevent entry of animals to the premises. 2.1.4. Roads and pathways: within the premises should be concreted in order to regularly wash and disinfect them.

2.1.5. Staff accommodation: preferable to be within the premises in order to reduce traffic to and from the farm.

2.1.6. Staff food: needs to pass through ultraviolet ray disinfection before allowed into the farm.

2.1.7. Feed silos: preferably placed close to the fence such that feed lorries deliver the feed from outside the fence.

2.1.8. Vehicles: should be parked outside the fence of the premises. When in need of entering the farm, they should be well washed and disinfected inside out.

2.1.9. Visitors: should not be allowed into the farm.

2.1.10. Equipment: should be disinfected before being carried to the farm and should be new or properly maintained to reduce frequent need for repair.

2.1.11. Showering facility: should be properly constructed along the fence with clear division between entry and exit, equipped with closets for used and for clean clothes. The facility needs to have a washing machine to wash used clothes and another to wash used boots.

2.1.12. Personnel: need to shower and fully change clothes upon entry to the premises. They should not raise any poultry at or around their houses.

2.1.13. Wood shaving / bedding and packaging: these need to be received from outside the fence into special stores built along the fence where they are subjected to disinfection via fumigation over several days prior to their use in the farm. Bedding and packaging should all be new non-used.

2.1.14. Handling of hatching or table eggs: such a store needs to be built along the fence such that delivery takes place from outside the fence.

2.1.15. Rodents: need to be controlled not by preventing their entry to the poultry houses only, but by controlling them on the premises by continuous baits and by surrounding the poultry houses by gravel.

2.1.16. Flies and beetles: should be continuously controlled on the premises within the houses.

2.1.17. Wild birds: should be discouraged from landing on the premises by preventing feed spillage, eliminating trees and vegetation and debris.

2.1.18. Dogs and cats: should not be allowed on the premises.

2.1.19. Burial of dead birds: well constructed burial pits should be built on the premises to dispose of dead birds. The pits should be tightly closed.

2.1.20. Ages: only one age group should be on the farm.

2.1.21. Types of birds: only one type of poultry should be raised on the farm, either grand parents or breeders or layers or broilers.

2.1.22. Chick source: stock should be clean and free from all contagious diseases.

2.1.23. Density: apply the recommended density that suits the house floor area, the available equipment, the ventilation capacity and the cooling /heating provided.

2.1.24. Feed: Make sure to buy or obtain disinfected, preferably heat treated transported in tight clean vehicles.

2.1.25. Water: the source should be regularly checked to be clean free from all bacteria or fungi. The water tanks need to be regularly cleaned and disinfected.

2.1.26. Vaccination: should be properly carried out for all viral diseases prevalent in the area. Serological monitoring of the flocks’ immunity levels should be conducted to determine when to revaccinate.

2.1.27. Debris: all garbage should be burnt on the premises regularly. Broken eggs may be dumped in the burial pit.

2.1.28. Depopulation and litter removal: since one age group and one type is of great necessity to effective Biosecurity, depopulation and litter removal can take place smoothly and quickly. Downtime should exceed two weeks after disinfection.

2.1.29. Cleaning after depopulation: thorough cleaning and disinfection should be practiced in the houses, equipment, ducting, drains, staff housing, offices, service, facilities, silos, hoppers, stores, roads, pathways, cooling pads, fans, etc. Appropriate disinfectants should be used.

2.1.30. Equipment maintenance: should be performed properly before repopulation.

2.1.31. Composting of manure: is advisable to be performed on a dedicated land prior to selling it.

2.1.32. Record keeping: is of great value to monitor activities and trace problems.

2.1.33. Educational program: to be implemented to keep the staff aware of all Biosecurity procedures and the rationale behind each step.

2.1.34. Swab samples: for bacterial and fungal or viral tests should be taken regularly from eggs, birds’ cloaca and trachea.

2.1.35. Air drags: and litter samples should be taken regularly from poultry houses to check for presence of bacteria especially salmonella, or fungi especially aspergillus.

2.1.36. All personnel working on the farms: should be subject to regular fecal test for salmonella. All positives should be dismissed.

2.1.37. HACCP certification: to ensure compliance with all above measures should become mandatory.

2.2.Hatcheries

2.2.1. Same measures that apply to farms apply to hatcheries in relation to construction, fencing, roads and pathways, staff accommodation, visitors, equipment, showering facility, personnel, dogs and cats, water, record keeping, educational program, personnel testing and HACCP certification.

2.2.2. Hatchery floors need to be tiled with granite tiles or proper epoxy. Hatchery walls should be tiled with ceramic tiles. All this is for easy and proper cleaning and disinfection.

2.2.3. Vehicles, that bring hatching eggs from breeder farms or that deliver chicks, need to be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected prior to leaving the hatchery and after returning to the hatchery.

2.2.4. Chick delivery plastic crates or hatching egg trays and crates or trolleys need to be washed and disinfected before being used or leaving the hatchery.

2.2.5. Hatchery refuse should be placed in thick tight plastic bags and sent out for dumping in the public land fill facility or to a rendering plant.

2.2.6. Special attention should be given to thoroughly cleaning, washing and disinfecting hatchers and hatcher room floors and walls after each hatch. This applies also to ducts and ventilators.

2.2.7. The hatchery should be designed such that the flow of work from the egg receiving end to the chick delivering area is one way with separation of staff between clean and dirty areas preventing their mix and their access to the non – designated area of work.

2.2.8. Vaccination, chicks sexing, chick sorting and chick counting needs to be performed with utmost care.

2.2.9. Swab samples: from hatching floors , walls setter and hatcher roofs, working tables and carousels, hatchers and setter walls, hatcher and setter floors, ducts, ventilators, etc. for bacterial and fungal tests.

2.2.10. Samples of day old chicks, hatcher fluff and shell particles should regularly be sent to check presence of bacteria or fungi.

2.2.11. Septic tanks: need to be tight and emptied whenever full.

2.3.Slaughter houses, meat processing facilities and egg grading or processing facilities.

2.3.1. Same Biosecurity measures applied to farms and hatcheries apply to these facilities in relation to construction, tiling of floors and walls, fencing, roads and pathways, staff accommodation, visitors, equipment, showering facility, personnel, dogs and cats, water, record keeping, educational program, personnel testing, vehicles, delivery trucks, crates, work flow, swab samples, product samples, septic tanks and HACCP certification.

2.3.2. Slaughtering meat and egg processing facilities need to be equipped with water treatment plants in order to treat the affluent water before discharging it to irrigation canals or public sewage.

2.3.3. Solid waste from such facilities needs to be rendered in an appropriate rendering plant situated on the site or transported by tight containers to rendering plants outside the premises. Such containers and vehicles need to be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected after each delivery.

3.Biosecurity and Avian Influenza (AI)

The poultry industry has been under the lime light since the emergence of Avian Influenza whether the low or high pathogenic forms. The fast spread of these viruses, their modification as well as mutation has led to human infection and over 400 human fatalities in many parts of the world. This factor has alerted scientists to fear possible mutation of AI to a level where human to human infection becomes possible leading to a pandemic.

Most governments in the world concentrated their efforts on the human factors in this episode more than the poultry health factor in spite of the fact that AI has killed so far over 400 million birds especially in the industrial sector.

Measures enforced in case of an outbreak have been advised by FAO and OIE and widely adopted by governments. These were limited to eradication (stamping out) of all poultry within a one to up to ten kilometer radius zone area from the infection point. The purpose of this measure is to control the spread of the virus beyond the point of infection by such a distance that ensures its total eradication.

This procedure proved effective if coupled with strict Biosecurity measures that ensured no poultry or poultry products movement outside the zoned area and a fair compensation to all farmers whose flocks were infected or condemned. The success of this procedure has so far been limited to industrial countries such as USA and certain European countries where such action was strictly implemented, and where rural or backyard poultry is rare. Almost all other countries in the world resorted to vaccination against the prevalent virus with varying degrees of zoning / condemnation / compensation/ Biosecurity measures.

Unfortunately only the commercial sector, in an effort to limit their losses in the developing and poor countries, has extensively used vaccination. However the rural sector and back yard poultry were left, in most of these countries, unvaccinated and hence subject to infection and death. Not only such poultry died but infection of certain owners kept on appearing and some of them died too.

These facts led FAO and OIE to recognize vaccination as an essential tool to limit the spread of AI especially in countries where strict and secure Biosecurity measures and fair compensation is not possible and where poultry keepers depend partly or wholly on them for their livelihood.

Vaccination, although has saved millions of poultry in all countries where AI disease spread, it appears that the degree of success varies from country to country. Factors such as potency of vaccines used, methods and frequency of vaccination, degree of exposure to live virus, and degree of Biosecurity play major roles. Furthermore, modification of the live virus and its sequencing is another new factor in the equation which is requiring to equally modify the vaccines used. Monitoring the titre levels and revaccination, in order to keep these titres high, is becoming a necessity to avoid exposure to the disease.

Nonetheless, appropriate Biosecurity measures are proving to be the most important factors in checking AI and its spread and hence in limiting the possibilities of its mutation and disastrous consequences.

4.FAO and OIE initiatives

FAO'S seventeenth session of the committee on Agriculture held in Rome 31 March - 4 April 2003 on Biosecurity in Food and Agriculture sets up FAO'S understanding of Biosecurity and describes the initiatives undertaken. This session recognized Biosecurity as never recognized by FAO before.

For FOA, Biosecurity broadly describes the process and objective of managing biological risks associated with food and agriculture in a holistic manner.

Biosecurity measures in agriculture are needed to i) protect agriculture production systems, and those dependent on these systems ; ii) protect human health and consumers confidence in agricultural products ; iii) protect the environment and promote sustainable production.

The issues encompassed in Biosecurity have traditionally been dealt with and implemented in a sectorial manner by means of food safety laws, and animal and plant quarantine and pesticide regulations. There is a growing recognition that Biosecurity will profit from a more integral approach.

FAO has recognized the growing importance of Biosecurity and therefore made it one of the Organization’s sixteen Priority Areas for Inter-disciplinary Action (PAIA). With aid of external assistance, FAO, through the Biosecurity PAIA, undertook to examine and advance Biosecurity in food and agriculture in order to explore possible synergies in relation to standard setting, information exchange and capacity building.

In order to broaden awareness of Biosecurity and to debate its relevance and practicality more widely, particularly in relation to the needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition, FAO convened an international Technical Consultation in Bangkok, 13-17 Jan, 2003, with the participation of 38 countries and eight international organizations, including Codex Alimentarius, the International Plants Protection Convention (IPPC), OIE, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Inter-governmental Technical Consultation was the culmination of an FAO process on Biosecurity which included the Inter-agency Meeting, the Expert Consultation, specialized studies and bilateral interaction with interested bodies. Conclusions and recommendations of the Consultation are:

a)Recognition of the advantages of more coherent, holistic approach to Biosecurity that sought synergies between the sectors at national and international levels, without necessarily creating new or unified structures.

b)Recognition of the central role of risk analysis as a framework for Biosecurity including across sectors.

c)Supporting the need for a variety of economic analyses in relation to Biosecurity.

d)Recognition of the central importance of capacity-building, in particular to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition to establish and sustain their Biosecurity systems, to meet international Biosecurity standards for food and agriculture and take advantage of trade opportunities.

e)Supporting the development of the International Portal for Food Safety and Animal and Plant Health as a valuable database and information tool for Biosecurity, which could help bring together the various sectors involved, nationally and internationally.

f)Using the word Biosecurity in all languages, and that it be italicized and capitalized, and not translated.

g)Considering that Biosecurity involves the management of biological risks in a comprehensive manner to achieve food safety, protect animal and planet life and health, protect the environment and contribute to its sustainable use.

h)Policymakers should recognize the importance of Biosecurity as a key element of sustainable development, and the benefits, including in trade that can be gained from comprehensive approaches to Biosecurity.

i)Countries should cooperate to address Biosecurity issues at regional and sub-regional levels.

j)Risk analysis and management frameworks are essential to achieve Biosecurity.

k)Countries should encourage adequate opportunities for appropriate participation by all stake holders in addressing Biosecurity and enable them to contribute to the design and implementation of Biosecurity risk management frameworks.

OIE and WHO seem to have left Biosecurity issues to FAO since all three organizations have collaborated in their efforts to combat AI and other poultry and animal diseases.

While WHO concentrated on the human element vis-à-vis AI or other contagious animal or plant diseases affecting humans, OIE concentrated its efforts on six main missions:

a)To ensure transparency in the global animal disease situation.

b)To collect, analyze and disseminate veterinary scientific information.

c)To provide expertise and encourage international solidarity in the control of animal diseases.

d)Within its mandate under the WTO agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement), to safeguard world trade by publishing health standards for international trade in animal and animal products.

e)To improve the legal framework and resources of national Veterinary Service.

f)To provide a better guarantee of food of animal origin and to promote animal welfare through a science-based approach.

These missions are achieved through different activities including the establishment of standards, guidelines and recommendations pertaining to animal health in the form of codes and associated manuals. These codes are designed as reference documents to be used by the veterinary administrations or the competent authorities of the member countries, to assist them in establishing the health regulations that their countries should apply to the import and export of live animals and animal products, so that the spreading of pathogens responsible for diseases to other animals or to human being is avoided. The OIE has also developed general principles relating to risk analysis methodology, which is comprised of four components, namely import risk assessment, assessment of veterinary services zoning/regionalization and surveillance and monitoring.

Perhaps the only area on Biosecurity that OIE has touched was under prevention and control of AI, where significant effort is focused on developing appropriate recommendations for Biosecurity in the context of backyard flocks via: Biosafety, Biosecurity and Prevention of Diseases and Hygiene and Disease Security Procedure in poultry Breeding Flocks and Hatcheries: Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2007.

5.Other initiatives on Biosecurity

EEC commission decision ( 2005/734/EC) of Oct. 19, 2005 was adopted laying down Biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early detection system in areas at particular risk.

This decision was amended on 21 October 2005 by adding article (2a) re additional risk mitigating measures as follows:

a)the keeping of poultry in the open air is prohibited without undue delay; however, the competent authority may authorize the keeping of poultry in open air provided the poultry are provided with food and water indoors or under a shelter which sufficiently discourages the landing of wild birds and prevents contact by wild birds with the feed or water intended for poultry;

b)outdoor water reservoirs required for animal welfare reasons for certain poultry are sufficiently screened against wild waterfowl;

c)the poultry is not provided with water from surface water reservoirs accessed by wild birds, unless such water was treated to ensure inactivation of possible virus;

d)the use of birds of the orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes as decoy during bird-hunting is prohibited;

e)Members States shall ensure that the collection of poultry and other birds on markets, shows, exhibitions and cultural events is prohibited. Models to rationalize regulatory functions among secretors in the quest for improved effectiveness and efficiency have appeared in a number of countries. For example, New Zealand has had a Biosecurity Act since 1993 a Biosecurity Minister and Council since 1999. In Belize, food safety, and animal and quarantine and environmental issues, are dealt with by a single authority, the Belize Agricultural and Health Authority. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), disciplines SPS measures in relation to international trade. The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and OIE provide international standards for food safety, plant health, and animal health respectively. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held a meeting represented by their Agricultural and Health Ministers on Jan. 28, 2004 in Bangkok. Recognizing the potential serious impact of AI on global public health, livestock production, trade and economic development, decided to:

a)Commit to more stringent surveillance and effective response systems, improved research and development capabilities, and sharing of information and technology;

b)Intensify national, regional and international efforts to tackle the outbreak of AI and future similar threats; c)Implement domestic measures to control AI having regard to the recommendations of WTO, OIE, WHO, and FAO;

d)Work closely with OIE to strengthen guidelines on reporting and surveillance system;

e)Promote rapid, transparent and accurate exchange of scientific information to provide early warning of potential outbreak, and consider to create a regional veterinary surveillance network to link it with human health surveillance mechanisms;

f)Strengthen cooperation with regional and international organizations and joint research and development initiatives to reduce the hazards of epizootic outbreaks on human health, share best practices, devise counter measures, and develop effective, low-cost diagnostic test kits, vaccination and anti-viral drugs;

g)Call for assistance and exchange of expertise to assist affected countries to enhance their epidemiological and laboratory capacity for prompt detection, monitoring, surveillance and controlling of the disease;

h)Investigate options for designing more Biosecurity developments of the poultry sector for both small scale and commercial production. ASEAN secretariat participated in the International Meeting of Ministers of Health on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in Ottawa 24 to 25 October 2005 and prioritized five key actions to respond the challenge of AI:

a)Strengthen institutional linkages within countries and across borders.

b)Develop partnership with all stakeholders in public and private sectors and civil societies.

c)Sharing information, knowledge and success.

d)Change mindset in farming and poultry management practices.

e)Expert leadership and be on top of the situation. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) produced a regulation on prevention of salmonella enteritidis (SE) in shell eggs in 2004 which included measures like: procurement of chicks and pullets, a Biosecurity program, pest and rodent control program, cleaning and disinfection of poultry houses, refrigerated storage of eggs, producer testing for SE, identification of a person responsible for SE prevention, record keeping requirements. The U.S. Department of Justice called on April 24, 2006 for developing a regional perspective to Biosecurity and pointed out the need for a new paradigm on Biosecurity thus recognizing it as a reality rather than a perception.

In the United Kingdom, poultry and poultry products movement restrictions were put in place. Identified zones were: Protection Zone (PZ), Surveillance Zone (SZ), Restricted Zone (RZ) where movements can or cannot take place without a license are listed for each zone.

6.Biosecurity Protocols

Several protocols have been established in various parts of world particularly in most U.S. States, the U.K., New Zealand and Australia, all addressing the Biosecurity issues for poultry production, poultry and egg processing and safety of consumable poultry products. Most of these protocols were prepared by poultry industry associations in collaboration with local authorities.

Below are two schemes that illustrate the degree of realization of the importance of Biosecurity by stakeholders and their willingness to abide freely and cooperatively by the scheme.

6.1.In New Zealand, the poultry industry enjoys a unique health status within the world. In an effort to maintain this status, a broiler growing Biosecurity manual was put out as the agreed standard between New Zealand broiler growing companies and the New Zealand Food Safety Authority. While it is a guide, however it contains mandatory requirements in the form of Acts, Regulations and Specifications. However, these requirements concentrate on the poultry and animal products and their suitability to human consumption.

The manual covers all the elements of on-farm Biosecurity as it impacts on food safety and animal health, including areas of responsibility of the growers, the processors, the catchers, the cleaners, and other associated personnel. The manual is to be used as a guide to the recommended minimum standards that company Biosecurity manuals and standard operating procedures must contain.

6.2.In Australia, the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation endorsed by the Australian Egg Industry Association, has put out the Code of Practice for Biosecurity in the Egg Industry. The Code aims to assist the Australian egg industry to understand the issues related to Biosecurity and to develop effective Biosecurity plans to minimize the occurrence and impact of disease outbreaks. The Code has been developed using Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles to facilitate the incorporation of Biosecurity measures into farm quality assurance programs.

The Code calls for compiling a Biosecurity manual which contains details of the HACCP team, product description process flow charts, a hazard analysis chart, a Biosecurity HACCP plan audit table, CCP monitoring forms, CCP work instructions, supporting programs, HACCP plan verification activities, staff training programs and good management practices. Third party auditors, whose main role is to examine the HACCP plan that has been developed, are to check that it is being implemented correctly.

The critical monitoring points identified in this Code are:

a)Entry of chicks, litter, equipment, vehicles, people and feed into started pullet farms.

b)Entry of litter, started pullets, adult fowls, equipment, vehicles, people and feed into egg production farms.

c)The presence of wild birds and rodents in sheds or where hens and pullets range.

d)Water sanitation on farms using surface water for internal shed fogging or bird drinking water and for disposal systems for dead birds, reject eggs and manure from the farm.

e)The presence of non-poultry bird species, other poultry and pigs on the farm.

7.Biosecurity measures that ought to be enforced

Having reviewed most literature on the subject of Biosecurity, one can conclude the following:

a)Biosecurity is a relatively new concept. It has been emphasized in a meaningful way after the emergence of Avian Influenza in many parts of the world.

b)Biosecurity was, until the emergence of AI, used in conjunction with biosafety and bioterrorism and referred to measures to produce safe food for human consumption.

c)OIE has not dealt with the subject even up to now except in joint meetings with FAO.

d)FAO has started addressing Biosecurity recently but several years after the emergence of AI.

e)Had the highly pathogenic form of AI (HPAI) not hit the poultry industry hard and HPAI not affect humans by making certain of them ill or die, neither the United Nations, represented by FAO, nor governments would have resorted to Biosecurity actions and measures to reduce the spread of this disease or ultimately other poultry diseases as well.

f)Biosecurity measures, within the capacity of individual farmers or poultry companies, were implemented at varying degrees for a long time. These measures were taken in view of their economic benefits to such institutions. Benefits included avoidance of bacterial disease infections such as coryza, cholera, mycoplasmas, salmonellas, and reduction of exposure to viral diseases such as Newcastle and recently avian influenza. Even though the level of Biosecurity on any farm needs to be continuously upgraded and improved, certain Biosecurity measures cannot be imposed by individual farmers or poultry companies. Such issues need to be handled by authorities or governments.

It seems that governments, due to the complexities of issuing laws and acts, have so far not adopted certain Biosecurity measures that could certainly reduce disease transmission from one farm to another or from ranging birds to other ranging birds or commercial farms.

Therefore, in order to really reduce the risks of poultry disease transmission, particularly Avian Influenza, governments have to interfere by issuing acts and directives in the form of laws and enforce their implementation. The most important mandatory measures that require enforcement by law are:

7.1.Minimum distance between farms

FAO and OIE advise minimum radial distances to form specific zones when implementing stamping-out of all poultry, even if uninfected, from the diseased central AI infected farm or poultry. This measure is but admittance that a certain minimum distance is required, even though coupled with strict quarantining to prevent movement of poultry outside the zoned area, in order to minimize or stop the transmission of the virus and eventually control the disease.

This prompts the call for specific minimum distances between farms and farm types. For example, grandparent farms need to be more isolated than parent farms and parent farms more than layer farms, and the latter more than broiler farms. Once established as a law, licenses for new farms have to be issued with these minimum distances in mind.

Existing farms not conforming to the new directive need to be given a reasonable time to either sell to or buy from neighboring farms so that management, poultry type and age groups can be unified.

7.2.Farm construction

Relevant authorities issuing licenses for building new farms or hatcheries or slaughter houses should modify their specifications and include all Biosecurity related standards such as:

a)Abide by minimum distances between farm sites or poultry facilities.

b)Specify construction specifications including concrete flooring, proper insulation, tight construction to prevent rodent or wild bird entry, appropriate ventilation, cooling, lighting, emergency windows etc.

c)Specify appropriate fencing of the site to prevent entry of animals to the premises, particularly dogs and cats.

d)Roads and pathways within the premises to be concreted.

e)Services complex such as offices, egg store, shower, post mortem room, laundry room, packaging store, wood shavings store, should all be properly constructed along the fence of premises.

f)Staff accommodation to be suitable for living situated away from the poultry houses at a location along the entry of the prevalent wind to the premises.

g)Underground water well should be located far away from the poultry houses, living accommodation, sewage tanks and burial pits, and should be properly closed.

h)Elevated water reservoir need to be constructed over a ground (not underground) reservoir. Both should be properly closed.

i)Burial pit or pits need to be well constructed and covered to prevent entry of animals and rodents. They need to be located at furthest point possible from water well, poultry houses, staff accommodation and services complex.

j)Trees should be prohibited on the premises to discourage wild bird roosting and nesting.

7.3.Types and age of birds

Legislation should include prevention of mixing types of chickens on one farm and keeping more than one age group of that type at any one time. It should also include prevention of keeping other animals on the premises especially pigs.

Grandparent and parent stock farmers have long realized these facts and have been abiding by this principle. In fact broiler farmers learnt this method the hard way too. There remain egg production complexes in most countries in the world, where we can still see multiple ages on one farm. These complexes present a threat to the recurrence of diseases especially AI, ND and mycoplasmas.

7.4.Dogs, cats and farm animals

Directives need to prohibit keeping dogs and cats on the farm premises as well as raising farm animals such as lambs, cattle, horses and particularly pigs.

In the case of dogs and cats, their continuous mobility in the farm premises is a source of contamination between and to the poultry houses and hence to the poultry itself. They may become carriers of certain bacteria or viruses that may infect poultry.

As far as pigs are concerned, there is a real and established fear that AI virus that infects pigs may mutate to a stage where it becomes infective from human to human.

7.5.Vaccination

Veterinary authorities should determine the diseases, especially viral, that spread and endanger poultry flocks in specific areas or nationwide. Where and whenever necessary, these authorities must request farmers to vaccinate against such diseases and should have the powers to take the necessary sera samples or swabs to check the immunity levels of such flocks. Same authorities should take care of vaccinating rural and backyard poultry at their own expense and via their staff.

7.6.Monitoring and surveillance

Veterinary authorities should impose regular surveillance of farm flocks and rural or backyard poultry to make sure that they do not harbour live viruses that may endanger other flocks. They need to have authority to condemn and stamp out such flocks.

Monitoring should also be imposed on flocks that need to be moved either from one farm to another, such as from pullet rearing to laying, or from farm to slaughterhouses. This procedure is needed to ensure freedom of such flocks from AI or other highly contagious diseases that might infect other poultry on their journey from the farm to their next destination. Permission to moving flocks is subject to their negative status, otherwise such flocks should be condemned/stamp-out and composted on the farm and the compost buried deep on the premises in an appropriate manner.

7.7.Handling of manure

Manure may harbour bacteria and viruses that can infect other flocks if moved in open trailers or vehicles. If the depopulated flocks were healthy, their manure may be moved in closed trucks to other destinations. If the depopulated flocks were condemned/stamped out, their manure needs to be composted with the flocks and deeply buried on the site.

7.8.Slaughter houses

New slaughter houses should only be permitted in far away locations from towns or villages or industrial zones, i.e. away from concentration of people. This is to avoid exposure of people to the live poultry that is being received at such slaughter houses.

Already existing slaughter houses close to concentration of people should be given a reasonable time to relocate.

7.9.Live markets

Live markets/ wet markets should eventually be prohibited, thus reducing the risk of exposing people to viruses especially AI.

Live/wet markets not only receive birds from commercial farms, which may be monitored, but they receive all types of poultry from rural and backyard poultry keepers, who are difficult to control or monitor and in most cases are unprotected by vaccination.

7.10.Live bird movement

All vehicles carrying live birds should be road checked for a special license to move such birds issued by the veterinary authorities confirming freedom of such birds from contagious diseases especially AI.

7.11.Housing of rural and backyard poultry and domesticated pigeons.

Rural and backyard poultry is exposed to wild and migrating birds which may be carrying diseases especially AI. Once infected, they show sickness, and in most cases their keepers rush to kill them, defeather and eviscerate them. All human fatalities in Egypt happened to be woman who did just that. I believe that the majority of human infections or fatalities in Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Turkey and other underdeveloped countries have occurred in a similar manner.

Therefore, it is becoming imperative that governments should impose housing of such poultry to avoid their exposure to wild and migrating birds. Such houses may be simple and inexpensive.

7.12.Free range poultry

For exactly the same reason that prompted the call for housing rural and backyard poultry, free range poultry should similarly be housed. The range needs to be covered and securely netted from all sides preventing wild and migrating birds from mixing with range birds.

7.13.Wild bird hunting

Ideally, hunting should be prohibited by law. However, hunting has become an industry in its own right. In order to reduce the harm that wild birds may inflict on hunters or processors of the hunted birds, well thought of regulations should be put in place to restrict hunting to reserves or identified remote areas from poultry complexes and concentrations of people. Hunted birds may not leave the designated areas unless properly dressed and cleaned.

Constructing special ponds and use of decoy should also be prohibited outside the designated hunting areas.

7.14.Compensation

Cooperation of stakeholders, in the effort to combat contagious disease especially AI, is an absolute must, whether they are commercial poultry farmers or peasants.

No condemnation/stamping out policy has worked in the world in the absence of fair and prompt compensation to farmers.

Developed and industrialized countries have practiced compensation very successfully and have been successful in containing AI without having to resort to vaccination. Besides being cooperative and understanding, farmers in such countries responded because they were fairly and promptly compensated for their condemned flocks, especially the healthy ones that happen to be situated in the zoned areas.

Governments in the developing or undeveloped countries do not have the financial means to compensate. Therefore, they resorted to practicing vaccination of flocks. However, inspite of the use of vaccines, certain failures may appear requiring stamping out. In such cases compensation becomes necessary.

Such countries may seek the help of the World Bank to obtain the necessary funds for compensating farmers, especially those farmers who are abiding by the Biosecurity regulations advised.

8.Conclusion

Avian Influenza (AI) is continuing to spread in the world, even though at a slower rate since the use of effective vaccines, especially in the countries where compensation is not possible and hence stamping-out fails, and where rural and backyard, non-vaccinated, poultry exists on a large scale.

Biosecurity is a well proven means of checking the spread of this as well as other contagious poultry diseases. However, Biosecurity measures have so far, been implemented by farmers at their own consent and will. Mandatory Biosecurity measures may have been imposed in the context of biosafety and food security.

Since AI is a threat to humans, and since the benefits of Biosecurity exceed avoidance of exposure to AI to improve poultry performance, enforcing Biosecurity measures on poultry farms and related facilities, such as hatcheries and slaughter houses, should be seriously considered and adopted by FAO and OIE.

In turn, FAO and OIE should persuade all governments of the world to adopt the same Biosecurity measures and enforce them by appropriate legislations and laws.

REFERENCES

1)FAO - Committee on Agriculture-Seventh Session, 31/3-4/4,2003 Biosecurity in Food and Agriculture.

2)EU Commission Decision 2005/745/EC of 21/10/2005 Biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of HPAI.

3)Poultry Industry of New Zealand- Broiler Growing Biosecurity Manual Info@pianz.org.nz

4)Code of Practice for Biosecurity in the Egg Industry- RIRDC publication No. 01/102, project No. MS001-02.http://www.rirdc.gov.au

5)Poultry Fact Sheet No. 26 – Cooperative Extension – University of California, Biosecurity for Poultry Flocks.

6)USDA – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service – Biosecurity Guide for Poultry and Bird Owners – April 2014.

7)California Department of Food and Agriculture – Commercial Poultry Biosecurity.

8)Territorial Animal Health Standards Commission Report – Sep. 2009 – Chapter 6.4 Biosecurity Procedures in Poultry Production.

9)Poultry Farm Biosecurity Field Manual – NC State University – Department of Poultry Science.

10)Biosecurity Legislation – Australian Department of Agriculture – Biosecurity Act 2015.